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INTRODUCTION
The government, specifically agencies in the executive branch, is often
criticized for being inefficient.1 These challenges can be the result of a
variety of inadequacies, including outdated technology, understaffed
agencies, and old-fashioned organizational constructs and processes.2
Resolving these inefficiencies is exceptionally difficult with the U.S.
government facing the challenge of serving the diverse and growing needs
of over 330 million people.3 Even so, improvements begin with addressing
the core issues. A primary way to increase efficiency, as displayed by the
innovations adopted in the private sector during the 1990s, is through
academic research regarding human behavior and modern technological
advancements.4
However, case studies into specific agencies demonstrate the
government suffers from an inability to solve ongoing problems, leading
* Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University, J.D. 2020.
1 Executive branch officials and agencies have addressed this problem and continue
to work on bipartisan solutions. See OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET, DELIVERING
GOVERNMENT SOLUTIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REFORM PLAN AND
REORGANIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS (2018), https://www.performance.gov/GovR
eform/index.html.
2 Id.
3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. AND WORLD POPULATION CLOCK (Dec. 26, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/popclock/.
4 Linda Gorman, Technology and Productivity Growth, THE NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON.
DEV., https://www.nber.org/digest/oct01/w8359.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2020)
(“The strong performance of productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s was in
fact attributable to accelerating technical change, not to poor measurement or to
temporary factors . . . [c]hanges in technology are the only source of permanent increases
in productivity . . . "). This article, and related academic study, echo the basic economic
principle of technological advancements increasing efficiency.
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to a waste of financial resources.5 The media has covered several examples
of these problems perfectly illustrating this phenomenon. A Veteran
Disability Claim appeal results in an average wait time of over four years,
which is disturbingly long given the major health and financial implications
of the decision.6 Also, the Department of Transportation implemented a
regulation requiring rearview cameras for certain automobiles.7 This
regulation took seven years to implement and costs approximately $20
million per life saved.8 Also, misaligned incentives created through the
privatization of security clearances resulted in rushed background
investigations, a federal investigation, over twenty-seven guilty pleas
related to false representations, and, ultimately, a broken system.9 Multiple
5 Steve Vogel, Veterans Face Another Backlog a Quarter-million Appeal Disability Claims,
WASH. POST (Sept. 8 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/veterans-faceanother-backlog-as-a-quarter-million-appeal-disability-claims/2013/09/10/0078154a15ba-11e3-804b-d3a1a3a18f2c_story.html (“A veteran who takes an appeal through all
available administrative steps faces an average wait of 1,598 days, according to [Veteran
Affairs (“VA”)] figures for 2012. If the veteran pursues the case outside VA to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, it takes an additional 321 days on average,
according to court documents . . . But VA officials acknowledge that the appeals system
must be transformed. Though VA is converting the claims process into an electronic,
paperless system, the great majority of appeals remain paper-bound . . .To prepare for
the influx of appeals, the Board of Veterans Appeals has hired 100 new lawyers in recent
months and has begun a push to handle more cases by video teleconference, a step that
can cut 100 days off the process, said Laura Eskenazi, vice chairman of the board”).
6 Id.
7See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 49 C.F.R. § 571.111 (2014).
8 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DEP’T OF TRANSP., RIN 2127-AK43,
FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD, REARVIEW MIRRORS; FEDERAL
MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARD, LOW-SPEED VEHICLES PHASE-IN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS (2010).
9 Jason Miller, Justice Obtains 27th Guilty Plea in Background Investigations ‘Flushing’ Case,
FED. NEWS NET. (July 19, 2018, 3:59 PM), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/agencyoversight/2018/07/justice-obtains-27th-guilty-plea-in-background-investigationsflushing-case/ (While discussing the current delegation of background investigations:
“[t]he Trump administration announced in June that it would transfer the entire
governmentwide security clearance portfolio, currently housed within OPM’s National
Background Investigations Bureau (NBIB), to the Pentagon.”); Dion Nissenbaum, Bottom
Line Drove Security Clearance at USIS, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 25, 2013, 6:43 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304330904579137443326694158
(“Grove City had an incentive to rush cases, former USIS officials say, because of its
contract terms: It (sic) would get the bulk of its payment, they say, when it sent a case to
a federal agency and the final payment when the agency closed the case. One of those
officials says the upfront payment was 90% for a period starting in 2008 . . . [s]ome
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attempts to eliminate the misaligned incentives did not fix the problem.10
Lastly, conflicting objectives and a communication failure between
agencies delayed and severely weakened the impact of the Volcker Rule in
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank Act”).11 These are just a few examples of government
inefficiencies causing taxpayer frustration and disdain.12 Of course, each
agency and regulation is unique. To address the major inefficiency
workers protested in writing but were told that they would be fired if they didn't do what
they were told, they say.”).
10 Christian Davenport, Even After Snowden, Quota System on Background Checks May Be
Imperiling U.S. Secrets, WASH. POST (June 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/security-clearance-contractors-still-stress-speed-over-thoroughnessworkers-say/2015/06/14/00d1bd80-09fa-11e5-95fdd580f1c5d44e_story.html(“Despite the congressional outcry, the contracts’ payment
system is still structured so that the faster the contractors turn over the cases to the federal
government, the quicker they get paid. And the federal government imposes a financial
penalty if the companies miss their deadline . . . [it was] alleged that the company had
submitted 665,000 cases that were incomplete, saying it was interested in clearing out the
shelves in order to hit revenue.”).
11 Justin Baer & Julie Steinberg, Bank Rule Challenges Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,
2013, at A1 (“The Volcker rule limits banks' ability to trade with their own cash, restricts
them from investing in risky hedge and private-equity funds and imposes rigorous
compliance requirements on the firms.”); Emily Flitter & Alan Rappaport, Big Banks in
Line for Looser Curbs on Risky Trades, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2018, at A1N (“[Dodd-Frank]
took five agencies three years to write it and has been criticized by Wall Street as too
onerous and harmful to the proper functioning of financial markets. On Wednesday, the
Federal Reserve proposed easing several parts of the rule, and four other regulators are
expected to soon follow suit . . . .”); Scott Patterson & Deborah Solomon, A Simple Bank
Rule Proves Difficult to Write, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2013, at A1 (“[The delay] concerns the
differing missions of the agencies, sometimes pitting the bank regulators—the Fed,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency—against
the SEC . . . SEC officials grew concerned the bank regulators weren't sharing their work.
Lawmakers began calling SEC officials to ask why the securities agency was stalling the
process . . . . There sometimes were squabbles over where to hold [meetings between the
agencies]. Bank-regulator staffers balked at traveling across Washington to the SEC's
offices near Union Station. Treasury officials at one point promised a side trip to a
Bojangles fried-chicken restaurant at Union Station as an incentive to make the trip,
winning the round. Negotiations became so difficult the SEC and some banking
regulators began to consider writing their own sets of trading regulations. Others warned
this could create chaos for banks.”).
12 See, e.g., Brian Riedl, 50 Examples of Government Waste, THE HERITAGE FOUND.
WEBMEMO 2642 (Oct. 2009), https://www.heritage.org/budget-andspending/report/50-examples-government-waste.2009.
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concerns within executive branch agencies and offer a workable solution,
it is necessary to narrow the issue to one agency and regulatory regime.
Thus, this paper will focus on increasing the efficiency of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) financial disclosure
regulations—primarily through simplification and modernization.
A basic argument supporting a completely free market economy
suggests disclosure, in general, is inefficient.13 However, the substantial
history of securities fraud proves disclosure is critical; unregulated markets
have historically resulted in tremendous deception and a weakened
economy.14 Thus, for the purposes of this paper, it is assumed financial
disclosure serves a highly valuable government interest. Interestingly,
numerous academics, corporate lawyers, economists, and industry
participants argue that the current financial disclosure requirements could
be minimized and still remain effective—each offering a variety of
explanations as to how and why.15 This discussion has gone on for years
and continues into today’s political dialogue.16
Financial disclosure protects investors from fraud, provides the
information allowing investors to make educated decisions, and facilitates
capital formation.17 In proposing ideas to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of the current financial disclosure regulatory regime, this
paper attempts to answer two primary questions: 1) Should a simplified
form of financial disclosure be introduced?; and 2) How can financial
disclosure, and the related body of regulations, be modernized via current
technology? Academic studies focused on investor behavior and mental
LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY, Supply and Demand, Markets and Prices,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/supplyanddemand.html (last visited
Sept. 26, 2020).
14 See Larry Bumgardner, A Brief History of the 1930s Securities Laws in the United States
and the Potential Lesson for Today, http://www.jgbm.org/page/5%20Larry%20Bumgardne
r.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2020).
15 This statement is supported throughout the paper by expert statements, past
regulations and related materials, industry comment letters, and other materials that
demonstrate how various market players have advocated for reduced financial disclosure.
16 See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Companies are Pushing for Less Disclosure. Is that Good for
Investors?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/busines
s/dealbook/sec-disclosure-investors.html (“What is the best protection for
shareholders? The SEC does not review whether an investment is a good one, only
whether enough information is available to judge the potential risks and rewards.”).
17 Financial disclosure is the act of making a company's financial information
available to investors through filing and/or sending a document or group of documents.
13
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capacity will provide guidance in answering Question One. To answer
Question Two, the paper will propose ideas resulting in increased
accessibility and user-friendliness for investors, as well as the potential for
reduced compliance costs for U.S. corporations in the long-term. In doing
so, the paper will analyze relevant actions taken by the SEC, as well as
address implementation barriers and globalization concerns. The paper is
focused on the inefficiencies and opportunities for improvement within
the SEC’s disclosure regulations, so the paper will only examine
approaches for simplification and modernization without contradicting
the policy reasons behind existing laws and regulations.
I. CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
Disclosure regimes exist in numerous industries, including, but not
limited to, medical, food and drug, motor vehicle, consumer protection,
and financial industries.18 The SEC, the agency in charge of regulating the
securities industry and enforcing federal securities laws, imposes
mandatory periodic and continuous disclosure requirements.19 In order to
be traded on a U.S. stock exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange
(“NYSE”) or NASDAQ, a company must file a registration statement with
the SEC such as a Form S-1.20 Continuous disclosure generally includes
annual and quarterly reports such as 10-K’s and 10-Q’s, but these can vary
based on the type of company.21 Periodic disclosure requirements such as
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–qq (2018); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–2084 (2018); 12 C.F.R. §
1026.40 (2020).
19 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–qq (2018); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80b-21 (2018); Eva
Su, CONG. RES. SERV., IF 11256, SEC SECURITIES DISCLOSURE: BACKGROUND AND
POLICY ISSUES (2019).
20 Fraser Sherman, How to Get Listed on the Stock Market, CHRON (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/listed-stock-market-3394.html (“The main function of
a stock exchange is to facilitate the transactions associated with both buying and selling
of securities. Buyers and sellers of shares and stocks can track the price changes of
securities from the stock markets (derivatives, equity etc.) in which they operate.”);
BankBazaar, How Does a Stock Exchange Function?, REDIFF (Sept. 25, 2009),
https://business.rediff.com/report/2009/sep/25/perfin-how-does-a-stock-exchangefunction.htm.
21 See Eva Su, supra note 19 (showing a 10-Q contains similar information as a 10-K
but has fewer requirements and is filed quarterly); Will Kenton, 10-K, INVESTOPEDIA:
INVESTING (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/10-k.asp (“A 10K is a comprehensive report filed annually by a publicly-traded company about its
financial performance and is required by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). The report contains much more detail than a company's annual report, which is
18
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an 8-K, Schedule 13K, Proxy Statements, and Forms 3, 4, and 5 also exist.22
These types of filings are mandatory upon a certain event—a merger,
bankruptcy, or a resignation of a director all prompt a version of periodic
disclosure.23
The financial disclosure requirements vary significantly depending on
a variety of factors. For example, investment companies must comply with
the Securities Act of 1933 (“’33 Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“’34 Act”), and the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“’40 Act”).24
Small businesses face fewer disclosure regulations than large corporations
because the SEC understands the significant burden high compliance
costs pose to small entities.25 In general, financial disclosure provides a
wide range of fiscal data and additional information helping investors
evaluate a company when making investment decisions.26
Financial disclosure regulations are extremely complex given the
various industry participants and types of corporations. Several other
securities laws intermingle with the financial disclosure requirements. For
sent to its shareholders before an annual meeting to elect company directors. Some of
the information a company is required to document in the 10-K includes its history,
organizational structure, financial statements, earnings per share, subsidiaries, executive
compensation, and any other relevant data.”).
22 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78a–qq (2018); 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80b-21 (2018); see also
Will Kenton, 8-K, INVESTOPEDIA: LAWS & REGULATIONS (July 23, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/1/8-k.asp (“An 8-K is a report of unscheduled
material events or corporate changes at a company that could be of importance to the
shareholders or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Also known as a Form
8K, the report notifies the public of events, including acquisitions, bankruptcy, the
resignation of directors, or changes in the fiscal year.”).
23 Kenton, supra note 21.
24 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80b-21; see generally James Chen, What Is an Investment
Company?, INVESTOPEDIA: INVESTING (May 12, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/i/investmentcompany.asp (defining investment company).
25 See SEC, Small Business and the SEC: A Guide for Small Businesses on Raising Capital
and Complying with the Federal Securities Laws, SEC: INVESTOR PUBLICATIONS (Feb 27,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/infosmallbusqasbsechtm.html. The term smaller reporting company, and
other specific types of small business that receive special treatment, are defined by federal
securities laws, rules, and regulations. See id.
26 E.g., Apple, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Nov. 3, 2017). Disclosure
documents, such as the 10-K referenced above, are filed with the SEC through the
EDGAR system and are available to the public. Filings & Forms, SEC (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
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example, there is a law requiring the delivery of a prospectus, which is a
form of financial disclosure, to all shareholders via mail.27 Additionally, a
company selling securities through interstate commerce must be registered
with the SEC and must file the financial disclosure through the SEC’s
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) system.28
Importantly, the SEC’s practices over the last decade reflect a desire
for progress – evidenced by the time, money, and resources its staff
invested in improving its financial disclosure regime.29 The investment
company industry, as suggested by the research of the Investment
Company Institute (“ICI”), has also been a consistent advocate for more
efficient and modernized financial disclosure.30 The willingness of the
SEC, ICI, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), and the
investors themselves, to seek increased efficiency and embrace the
resulting modifications is encouraging.31 The internet has transformed the
27 SEC, FINAL RULE: DELIVERY OF DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS TO HOUSEHOLDS
(1999), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7766.htm.
28 Filing a Registration Statement, SEC: SMALL BUSINESS (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/smallbusiness/goingpublic/howtofile. The EDGAR system is
open to the public. The system can be used to locate filings and access the current and
historic financial disclosure documents of the companies registered with the SEC. See
EDGAR: Company Filings, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companyse
arch.html.
29 See, e.g., Investment Company Reporting Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 27279
(proposed June 12, 2015); SEC, Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies (Jan. 13, 2009); SEC, Investment
Company Reporting Modernization (Oct. 13, 2016); SEC, Optional Internet Availability of
Investment Company Shareholder Reports (June 5, 2018). These regulations, among other
things, modernized the information made available in financial disclosure and created an
optional new delivery mechanism under certain circumstances.
30 See, e.g., Inv. Co. Inst., The Profile Prospectus: An Assessment by Mutual Fund
Shareholders—Summary
of
Research
Findings
(1996), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_profprspctus3.pdf; Inv. Co. Inst., The Profile
Prospectus: An Assessment by Mutual Fund Shareholders (Volume II)
(1996), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_profprspctus2.pdf; Inv. Co. Inst., Understanding
Investor Preferences for Mutual Fund Information (2006), https://www.ici.org/pdf/rp
t_06_inv_prefs_ full.pdf. These reports include the evaluation of financial disclosure
regulation, surveys of fund owners, academic studies, estimates of disclosure costs, and
more.
31 FINRA is a private self-regulatory agency that works alongside the SEC. They
oversee brokerage firms and provide regulatory assistance. “FINRA plays a critical role
in ensuring the integrity of America’s financial system—all at no cost to taxpayers.
Working under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission, we: write
and enforce rules governing the ethical activities of all registered broker-dealer firms and
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ability of an individual to gather information and technology continues to
progress at an alarming rate.32 Now, it is time for financial disclosure
regulations to meet the needs of the modern investor.
All securities market players, including the major regulatory bodies,
small businesses, large corporations, investment companies, and individual
investors, have an incentive to support making disclosure more efficient,
modern, and user-friendly.33 However, a challenge arises in finding a
balance between reducing regulatory requirements and ensuring investor
education and protection. Unsurprisingly, the current financial disclosure
regulation has failed to find the perfect middle ground; major inadequacies
currently hinder efficiency and effectiveness.34 A few regulatory changes
registered brokers in the U.S.; examine firms for compliance with those rules; foster
market transparency; and educate investors.” FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., What We Do,
https://www.finra.org/about/what-we-do.
32 See generally Max Rosser & Hannah Ritchie, Technological Progress, OUR WORLD IN
DATA (2019), https://ourworldindata.org/technological-progress#citation (“The
exponential growth rates that we have observed over the last decades seem to promise
more exciting technological advances in the future. Many other types of technology have
seen exponential growth rates . . . . A couple of exceptionally promising examples are:
Butters’ Law of Photonics and Rose’s Law. Butters’ Law says the amount of data one can
transmit using optical fiber is doubling every nine months, which you can convert and
say that the cost of transmission by optical fiber is halving every nine months. Rose’s
Law describes the exponential growth of the number of qubits of quantum computers.
If this growth rate should remain constant, it leads to some mind-bending
opportunities.”).
33 The SEC mission statement is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. A user-friendly interface certainly
protects investors and in theory would promote a stronger market as investors have a
better platform to educate themselves. FINRA has the same interests as the SEC.
Investors receive the benefit of avoiding information overload and attention capacity
issues discussed later in this paper. This will let them make better investment decisions
in a quicker amount of time. Larger companies can use the user-friendly platform to
attract investors and lobby for deregulation once some of the new disclosure platforms
and strategies prove effective. This could decrease compliance cost in the future which
will be great for small businesses and investment companies and their clients. In general,
a more user-friendly platform could jumpstart a process that includes the SEC
considering modifying other disclosure regulations based off industry comments and
investor satisfaction. See SEC, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.ht
ml.
34 Clearly, this is a question of degree. The research referenced later will provide a
basis for this statement. It would be extremely unlikely that any research would conclude
that disclosure regulation is currently, or ever can be, at the perfect balance. This paper
will focus on providing a few examples of the most current and relevant inadequacies
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will provide examples of how minor adjustments and an openness to
experimentation can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of financial
disclosure regulations. The result could mean a major leap in reaching the
pareto-efficient point in financial disclosure regulation, instead of the
minor steps we have observed over the past several years.35
II. ACADEMIC RESEARCH: THE BENEFITS OF SIMPLIFICATION
An entire subsection of behavioral economic and cognitive
psychology academic research suggests simplifying disclosure could be
beneficial, as investors often ignore the filings or are misled by their
personal interpretation of the data.36 The most current academic research
suggests that too much information forces the reader to simplify the
information on their own, which leads to poor decision-making.37 For
and solutions to fix, or improve, these issues.
35 “Pareto efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is an economic state where resources
cannot be reallocated to make one individual better off without making at least one
individual worse off. Pareto efficiency implies that resources are allocated in the most
economically efficient manner . . . An economy is said to be in a Pareto optimum state
when no economic changes can make one individual better off without making at least
one other individual worse off . . . In neoclassical economics, alongside the theoretical
construct of perfect competition, [sic] is used as a benchmark to judge the efficiency of
real markets—though neither perfectly efficient nor perfectly competitive markets occur
outside of economic theory.” Jim Chappelow, Pareto Efficiency, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 25,
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pareto-efficiency.asp. The minor steps
that I am referring to include the SEC regulations referenced in footnote 28 and the body
of research related to improving financial disclosure.
36 E.g., Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, U. MICH.
L. SCH. SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY (2003) (“[I]investors will have limited attention
spans, [so] requiring more disclosure may cause them to ignore more important
information. Indeed, armed with an overconfident sense of his ability to digest mountains
of disclosure, an investor may miss important aspects of disclosure.”). Additional
citations throughout this section of the paper will add further support for this statement.
37 Tony Paredas, Blinded by Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, WASH. U. L. REV., Paper No. 03-02-02, (2003) (“[B]ecause of bounded
rationality … people can only process a finite amount of information during any
particular period of time . . . [S]tudies show that when faced with complicated tasks that
involve vast quantities of information, people tend to adopt simplifying decision
strategies that require less cognitive effort, but that are less accurate than more complex
decision strategies.”); Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9–14 (1978); Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics
and Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REV. 253, 272–73 (1959); Petra Persson, Attention
Manipulation and Information Overload, Cambridge Univ. Press, Working Paper No. 17-024,
(2017) (“Cronqvist and Thaler (2004) study the retirement savings plan introduced in
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example, an investor may decide to purchase stock based on the first five
pages of a 150-page document because they are incapable of properly
processing the information beyond the first few pages. Also, an investor
may make a financial decision based on a personal simplification of data—
the data provided may be very complex, but the investor may internally
summarize the perceived takeaways in an attempt to process all the
information in the document.
This concept is referred to as “information overload,” which implies
that a reader has a set capacity for the amount of information that can be
processed and ultimately reaches a point where receiving more
information has negative consequences.38 The relevance and concern
regarding information overload have both grown as the disclosure
requirements have generally increased over time.39 For example, Walmart’s
initial public offering (“IPO”) prospectus in 1970 was less than 30 pages,
while Uber’s IPO prospectus in 2019 was over 415 pages.40

Sweden in 1993. Eligible Swedes were encouraged to choose five out of 456 funds, to
which their savings would be allocated. The study reports that one third did not make
any active choice; their savings were instead allocated to a default fund.”). Information
overload seems a likely reason that so many Swedes rely on the default choice: comparing
hundreds of funds is a Herculean task for ordinary households, and one might expect
many of them to resort to the default or make superficial active decisions. Indeed,
studying the same Swedish reform, [research] shows that funds that (for exogenous
reasons) were better represented in the fund catalogue—that is, have better “menu
exposure”—received more active contributions. Similarly, a study of retirement savings
plan in the United States showed that making the decision problem less complex—by
collapsing a multidimensional problem into a binary choice—increases enrollment in the
plan.
38 Paredas, supra note 37, at 419.
39 Eva Su, supra note 19 (“As disclosure requirements and related costs have generally
increased over time, questions have arisen over whether disclosed information is readable
and understandable to investors . . . Current policy debates question whether the current
disclosure regime leads to information overload—that is, whether the high volume of
disclosure makes it difficult for investors to find the most relevant information.”).
40 Id.; Adam Hayes, Initial Public Offering (IPO), INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp (last updated Sep. 4, 2020) (“[An IPO] refers to the process
of offering shares of a private corporation to the public in a new stock issuance. Public
share issuance allows a company to raise capital from public investors . . . [I]t also allows
public investors to participate in the offering. A company planning an IPO will typically
select an underwriter . . . they will also choose an exchange in which the shares will be
issued and subsequently traded publicly.”).
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Additionally, academics have coined the term “attention capacity” to
represent the amount of information an individual can remember.41 A
study of brand recognition has shown that a typical consumer can
remember 12 bits of information per brand.42 This is significantly less than
the amount of information in one section of a Registration Statement, 10K, or 8-K. Critically, studies have concluded that investors, more often
than not, do not even read financial disclosures.43 This body of research
suggests financial disclosure would be more effective if it was simplified
and shortened, made more user-friendly, and made more accessible.
Although some investors do not read financial disclosure, and still may
not even if it is simplified and modernized, critical information must be
made available to those wanting to make educated financial decisions.
Research suggests current disclosure regimes may not be effective at
enabling a reader to make an educated decision.44 This exemplifies a major
inconsistency requiring immediate redress. The Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) faced challenges regarding the effectiveness of its
disclosure regulations, so it conducted research in an attempt to solve these
problems.45 The FTC concluded that its disclosure regime was not as
effective as the agency desired, but there were various opportunities for

See J. Jacoby et al., Time Spent Acquiring Product Information as a Function of Information
Load and Organization, 8 PROC. ANN. CONVENTION AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, 813 (1973).
42 Id. at 813–14 (“Evidence suggests that a point of information overload may be
reached beyond which additional information would produce dysfunctional
consequences. Read-in time expenditures by [thirty-two] housewives was studied as a
function of the number of brands (4, 8, 12, or 16) and amount of information (4, 8, 12,
or 16 bits) per brand. Results indicate increasing time expenditures up to [twelve] bits of
information per brand, after which read-in time expenditures decreased.”).
43 Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding
Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1455–56 (2001) (“[T]hat investors typically do
not read disclosure documents when investing in securities.”).
44 Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Consumer
Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES., 436, 438 (1984) (“While consumers may employ
heuristics to limit the intake of information, these heuristics may often involve a tradeoff
between simplifying and optimizing.”). Additionally, the studies referenced previously
reach similar conclusions. See, e.g., Su, supra note 19; Jacoby et al., supra note 41; Prentice,
supra note 43.
45 LORRIE CRANOR, ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PUTTING DISCLOSURE TO THE
TEST (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/puttingdisclosures-test/disclosures-workshop-staff-summary-update.pdf.
41
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improvement.46 In response to the study, the FTC made several changes
to better enable readers to educate themselves.47 These changes included
listing the most important information first, avoiding repetition, and using
unambiguous language.48 The solutions all had one thing in common—
simplification.49
Simplified disclosure, if done correctly, could eliminate the practice of
strategically placing unfavorable data deep within a document.
Corporations, aware that investors do not generally read disclosure, have
an opportunity to “hide” critical undesirable data inside an extensive and
complicated document.50 This practice was so prominent and
troublesome, that a Supreme Court case addressed the issue.51 The
Supreme Court attempted to eliminate this potential problem by ruling
that only “material” information should be included in financial

46 Lorrie Cranor, FTC Disclosure Evaluation Research from the Archives, FED. TRADE
COMM’N: TECH@FTC (Sept. 12, 2016, 1:35 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/techftc/2016/09/ftc-disclosure-evaluation-research-archives (“[T]he FTC
conducted consumer testing of consumer mortgage disclosures and found that the
disclosures in use at the time were not effective at conveying mortgage costs to many
consumers. Using a combination of long interviews with recent mortgage borrowers and
quantitative controlled testing, these studies found that prototype disclosures developed
for the study were significantly more effective. Later the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau commissioned further prototype development and testing . . . ”).
47 CRANOR, ET AL., supra note 45. A public workshop on improving disclosure at the
FTC included groups of expert panelists that made recommendations for improving
disclosure. Id. at 1. The improvements included, but were not limited to, using simple,
unambiguous language wherever possible, having an organized structure, listing the most
important or unexpected information first, presenting information that shows people
why disclosure may be relevant to them, avoiding repeated disclosure that results in
readers becoming habituated and thus ignoring it, and considering the timing of the
disclosure releases. Id. at 11. These recommendations were made based off support from
controlled testing and extensive interviews. Id. at 12.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Corporations have been accused of placing data in certain parts of the financial
disclosure that are less likely to be read or understood. For example, pages at the end of
the document or words at the center of a page are less likely to be read than an earlier
page or words at the beginning of a page. Certain rules determine the order of types of
data, what data can be provided, and how that information is to be presented, but
corporate attorneys have creative control and have used this limited discretion to benefit
their company at, what could be, the expense of a potential shareholders.
51 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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disclosure.52 Unfortunately, this resulted in a subjective case-by-case
analysis in an attempt to determine what constitutes “material
information.”53
The totality of these academic studies overwhelmingly suggests that
simplified disclosure can increase efficiency and effectiveness.54 However,
answering the questions of how to simplify disclosure and to what degree
are no easy task. Thus, the question of what simplified disclosure would
look like, as well as how modernization can contribute to the solution,
must be addressed.
III. SIMPLIFIED DISCLOSURE: CASE STUDIES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Behavioral Economics Works, a Canadian think-tank, conducted a
behavioral experiment in which it prepared a model simplified financial
statement to research effective disclosure techniques.55 The study
compared its model annual financial statement with five annual financial
statements provided by dealer member firms of The Investment Fund
Institute of Canada (“IFIC”).56 Behavioral Economics Works recruited
2,597 English-speaking Canadians from across the country to participate
in the experiment and the average age of the participants was 51.57 The
participants owned a minimum of one investment product and had a
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 448 (2003) (discussing TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway: “[T]he Supreme Court held that a fact is ‘material’ if ‘there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to
vote’. In adopting this standard, the Supreme Court rejected the view that a fact is
material if an investor ‘might’ find it important. The Court was concerned that such a low
threshold of materiality would lead to a flood of disclosures that would ultimately swamp
investors: ‘Some information is of such dubious significance that insistence on its
disclosure may accomplish more harm than good . . . [M]anagement’s fear of exposing
itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an avalanche
of trivial information—a result that is hardly conducive to informed decision-making.’
This relates to the concept of ‘attention manipulation,’ in which management
intentionally hides negative information within the disclosure or organizes data in a
confusing and manipulative way.”).
53 Id.
54 This statement is supported by the studies referenced in this section.
55 KELLY PETERS, ET AL., BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS APPLIED TO FINANCIAL
DISCLOSURE 3 (Feb. 2019), https://www.ific.ca/en/news/ific-and-beworks-releasebehavioural-economics-research-report/.
56 Id. at 68.
57 Id. at 13.
52
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minimum of one-year of experience as an investor.58 Importantly, the
numbers and information included within the model simplified disclosure
did not differ from the original disclosure.59 The conclusion of the study
was clear – simplified disclosure provides several benefits, the most
important of which is increasing the investor’s average return on
investment.60 The study also found that the benefits of simplified financial
disclosure include a higher percent of pages viewed, better information
comprehension scores, and increased investor confidence in their
understanding of the information.61 These benefits directly solve the
problems raised from information overload and attention capacity.
The tools used in crafting the experiment’s model financial statement
can be applied to traditional Registration Statements, 10-Qs, 10-Ks, and
other SEC financial disclosure documents. These strategies include
eliminating complicated financial data that most investors are not familiar
with, emphasizing the most important data, having summary boxes on
each page, and eliminating legalese and repetition.62 This study provides a
framework for successfully simplifying disclosure, but is not exhaustive. A
major takeaway from the study is that even minor changes, such as making
more comprehensible graphics and using bullet points, can have a
significant impact.63 This indicates that technology should be used to fully
realize the benefits when adopting a similar simplification framework.

Id.
Id. at 93.
60 Id. at 14–16 (“[I]nvestors who viewed the [simplified disclosure] were more
accurate when answering questions that assessed detailed comprehension. These
investors were also more confident about their understanding of the statement they had
viewed . . . . This suggests that investors’ detailed comprehension of complex statement
components was supported by a combination of simplified text [and] chunking
information thematically . . . Given that there was no significant difference between the
simple and comprehensive [disclosure], [it can be] conclude[d] that a boost to investors’
detailed comprehension was achieved by incorporating [the simplified disclosure] tactics
. . . [The study] found that across a variety of measures . . . the [simplified disclosure]
further enhanced key investor outcomes. The[se] [investors] also performed better with
regard to percent of pages viewed.”).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. (concluding that, “[e]ven relatively minor changes to language and graphics
have a significant and positive impact on investors' detailed comprehension of their
statements and their intentions to take action in service of achieving their goals”). BE
Works recommends, among other things, simplifying the statement by reducing the
58
59

2020]

THE SIMPLICITY IN MODERNIZING FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

121

Furthermore, ICI has advocated for the SEC to implement similar
changes as those used by the FTC and IFIC.64 Recently, the ICI
recommended that the SEC adopt a rule that would require registered
companies to file a new “summary report.”65 This report would contain
only “key information”—internal studies indicate that only including the
most relevant data would result in an increased likelihood that investors
would read it and find it helpful.66 The ICI answered the question of what
specific data should be considered key information through its 2017
Mutual Fund Shareholder Tracking Survey.67 It was determined that key
information included, but was not limited to, the historical performance
of the fund, the performance of the fund compared to index funds, and

amount of text and summarizing key information with bullet points presented near the
top-left corner of the page.
64 ICI is the leading association representing regulated funds globally, including
mutual funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), closed-end funds, and unit investment
trusts (UITs) in the United States, and similar funds offered to investors in jurisdictions
worldwide. ICI seeks to promote public understanding and advance the interests of
funds, their shareholders, directors, and advisers. INV. CO. INST., About ICI—Membership,
https://www.ici.org/about_ici/membership. The following citations in this paragraph
support this statement.
65 Letter from Susan Olson, General Counsel, Division of Investment Management,
to Brent Fields, Secretary, SEC (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1218/s71218-4932121-178430.pdf (“In furtherance of the Commission’s efforts to enhance
the investor experience, we recommend that the Commission consider proposing a rule
creating a new, optional summary shareholder report with key information in a prescribed
order. Results from our investor testing of a prototype for a summary shareholder report
indicate investors would be more likely to read the summary than the full-length
shareholder report and find a summary helpful to compare different funds.”).
66 Id.
67 Id. (“ICI’s 2017 Mutual Fund Shareholder Tracking Survey included a question
that asked mutual fund–owning households to rank the importance of a variety of factors
when making their mutual fund purchase decisions. When asked about the information
they consider when choosing a mutual fund, 92[%] of mutual fund–owning households
said that they reviewed the historical performance of a fund, with 50[%] indicating a
fund’s historical performance was very important when making their fund purchase
decision. [87%] of mutual fund–owning households indicated that they considered a
fund’s performance compared with an index, when making their purchase decision, with
35[%] saying it was very important. Fund fees and expenses were found to be a very
important consideration in fund selection. About nine in [ten] mutual fund–owning
households indicated they reviewed the fund’s fees and expenses, with 40[%] indicating
the fund’s fees and expenses were very important when making their purchase
decision.”).
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fund fees and expenses.68 This survey also found that 90% of investors
agreed that ICI’s prototype summary report contained enough
information to make educated financial decisions and made comparing
data between funds easier.69 The real shareholder reports that were used
as part of the study were seen as difficult to understand by 67% of fund
owners and very difficult to understand by 24% of fund owners.70 Not
only did investors agree that a prototype summary report was effective,
but this was also corroborated by the three-question survey on
comprehension at the end of the report.71 These questions tested the
investor’s comprehension of the prototype summary report; the results
demonstrated that the prototype summary report helped investors answer
content-related questions correctly.72
The first step in making financial disclosure more efficient is to
address information overload and attention capacity concerns by
implementing a rule that requires that registered companies file a one-page
summary report with key information.73 The counterargument is that this
will increase costs and further contribute to the problem by increasing the
current financial disclosure requirements. However, paired with the
modernization solution, this rule will pay off by eliminating unnecessary
filing requirements in the future.74

Id.
INV. CO. INST., MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS’ VIEWS ON SHAREHOLDER REPORTS:
REACTIONS TO A SUMMARY SHAREHOLDER REPORT PROTOTYPE 4, 10 (October 2018),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_ 18_summary_ shareholder.pdf.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 69, at 2. The key information will be the information
that investors and experts determine to be the most critical based off of the ICI research
as well as forthcoming SEC and other group studies.
74 If the summary report is successful, it could lead to eliminating summary
prospectuses, research into eliminating 10-Q’s, shortening the 10-K, and eliminating and
shortening other reporting requirements. Additionally, investors are more likely to read a
one-page report, so a primary purpose behind the disclosure regime is more likely to be
realized. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
68
69
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IV. MODERNIZATION: PAST SEC ACTION AND
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The SEC has already addressed several inefficiencies in its disclosure
regime. For example, it has taken steps to eliminate duplicative and
overlapping filing requirements imposed by multiple federal securities
statutes such as the ‘33 Act, ’34 Act, and ’40 Act.75 Additionally, the SEC
has relaxed numerous requirements for small businesses so that
compliance costs will not force these companies out of the market.76 The
relaxed requirements have neither increased fraud nor decreased investor
satisfaction.77 The SEC has implemented rules that seem to focus on
modernizing and simplifying disclosure, but clearly, the opportunity for
further improvement still exists.78
Increasing accessibility and readability has been a common talking
point among executives at the SEC.79 An example of a recent technological
improvement in the SEC’s disclosure regime occurred under Item 601 in
Regulation S-K.80 This regulation requires, among other things, that certain
E.g., Cam C. Hoang, New SEC Rules Eliminates Duplicative, Overlapping, Outdated
Disclosure Requirements, GOVERNANCE & COMPLIANCE INSIDER (Aug. 19, 2018),
https://governancecomplianceinsider.com/new-sec-rules-eliminates-duplicativeoverlapping-outdated-disclosure-requirements/.
76 See, e.g., J.D. Harrison, SEC Finalizes Key JOBS Act Rules for Small Businesses, WASH.
POST, (Mar.25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-smallbusiness/wp/2015/03/25/sec-finalizes-key-jobs-act-rules-for-small-businesses/.
77 See id.
78 Eva Su, CONG. RES. SERV., IF11256, SEC. SECURITIES DISCLOSURE:
BACKGROUND AND POL’Y ISSUES (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11256.pdf
(“The SEC has launched recent initiatives to simplify disclosure, for example, issuing a
final rule regarding “Disclosure Update and Simplification,” effective November 15,
2018.”).
79 See, e.g., Laura S. Unger, Comm’r, SEC, Rethinking Disclosure in the Information
Age: Can There be Too Much of a Good Thing?, Remarks at the Internet Securities
Regulation American Conference Institute (June 26, 2000), http://www.sec.gov./news/
speech/spch387.htm (“As the Commission pursues new ways to help democratize access
to investment information, we have to remember that information can only empower
investors if they understand it and can effectively apply it. Access to information isn’t a
substitute for knowing how to interpret it.”).
80 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2020); Securities Law Advisory: SEC Finalizes Rules to
Modernize
Regulation
S-K,
ALSTON
&
BIRD
(April
3,
2019),
https://www.alston.com/en/insights/publications/2019/04/sec-finalizes-rules-onregulation-s-k. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 232, 239, 248 (2020) (regulation S-K
establishes reporting requirements for publicly held companies).
75
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financial disclosure documents must provide hyperlinks to all previouslyfiled documents that were referenced in the current filing.81 The practice
of using hyperlinks should be expanded to references to other sections
within the same document. This will enable investors to easily navigate the
larger disclosure documents. While this modification could be viewed as
repetitive and tedious, given that Item 601 is already in place, creating new
hyperlinks will take minimal additional time and effort. Since investors
rarely read the entire disclosure document, having a quick reference to
other sections when skimming the document could be beneficial to
investors.82
The next step in modernizing financial disclosures is to make them
available on user-friendly platforms that incorporate interactive graphs. A
past SEC Commissioner commented that financial disclosure graphs in
electronic form would allow investors to interact with the disclosure and
view actual data points with one click of a mouse.83 A few investment
companies have commented on SEC proposed regulations advocating for
pilot programs to test new technology and features to make disclosure
more user-friendly.84 These new types and features of financial disclosure
could be ineffective, more costly, or ignored by investors. However, the
17 C.F.R. § 229.601 (2020); ALSTON & BIRD, supra note 80.
See Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations
Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L. J. 1397, 1456 (2002).
83 Mark Story, Introduction to Interactive Data, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/rss/xbrl/in
teractive_data1.htm (last modified May 21, 2007).
84 See Letter from Jonathan Chiel, Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Fidelity Investments, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-18/s71218-4593694-176325.pdf (“We strongly
encourage the SEC to foster innovation by creating a pilot program for investment funds
that wish to experiment with interactive disclosure technology. . . As with almost any
technology initiative, all of this takes time and resources. Accordingly, we would prefer
to see the SEC set up voluntary pilot programs to allow issuers to experiment with
interactive disclosures and better determine their feasibility and utility for investors. This
pilot program can allow funds the ability to obtain real-time input and feedback from
public testers, which designers can then incorporate and re-present to focus groups for
additional input.”); Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at the Financial Planning
Association 2018 Major Firms Symposium: Pickups and Put Downs, SEC (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-100218 (discussing the importance
of flexibility, “[a]llow[ing] pilot programs, and provid[ing] a principles based approach to
disclosure so that the industry can innovate”); Letter from Michael J. Woodall, CEO,
Putnam Investments, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.sec.g
ov/comments/s7-12-18/s71218-4715274-176689.pdf.
81
82
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pilot program could be used to test their effectiveness on consenting
investors and would be completely optional, thus minimizing such
concerns.85 Market leaders would likely want to use a pilot program to
retain market share and provide customers with the same services other
companies are providing. Additionally, there would be less of a learning
curve if a future regulation were to require the new disclosure on userfriendly platform. The SEC should allow these pilot programs through
either exemptive relief or no-action letters.86 In the investment company
sector, the pilot programs would likely be employed by market leaders such
as Fidelity, Vanguard, JP Morgan, and Blackrock.87
The pilot programs will test tailoring disclosure to user-interfaces such
as iPads, laptop touch screens, smartphones, etc., so that navigating the
documents is easier and more interactive than with paper form. The new
user-friendly platforms would increase accessibility because the disclosure
would be available any time your smart device is available.88 Additional
See Letter from Jonathan Chiel, Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Fidelity Investments, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.sec.go
v/comments/s7-12-18/s71218-4593694-176325.pdf (stating that Fidelity “would prefer
to see the SEC set up voluntary pilot programs”).
86 See Definition of Exemptive Relief, LAW INSIDER, https://www.lawinsider.com/dicti
onary/exemptive-relief (last visited October 5, 2020) (“[E]xemptive relief means any
approval, decision, declaration, designation, determination, exemption, extension, order,
ruling, permission, recognition, revocation, waiver or other relief sought under securities
legislation or securities directions.”); No-Action Letters, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersnoactionhtm.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2017) (“An individual or
entity who is not certain whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute
a violation of the federal securities law may request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC
staff. Most no-action letters describe the request, analyze the particular facts and
circumstances involved, discuss applicable laws and rules, and, if the staff grants the
request for no action, concludes that the SEC staff would not recommend that the
Commission take enforcement action against the requester based on the facts and
representations described in the individual's or entity's request. The SEC staff sometimes
responds in the form of an interpretive letter to requests for clarifications of certain rules
and regulations.”).
87 See Mike Dunn, Mutual Fund Company Market-share Ranking August 2019, MUTUAL
FUND DIRECTORY (Aug. 16, 2019), https://mutualfunddirectory.org/mutual-fundcompany-market-share-ranking-august-2019/ (Each of these companies listed ranks in
the top 6 of assets under management (“AUM”) and have close to 3% of the market
share or greater.).
88 Providing the disclosure through email as the default rule, as suggested later, or
through an app or text message, would allow the document to be viewed by an investor
at his or her convenience. See discussion infra Part V.
85
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benefits of pilot programs testing new technologies and features include:
using QR codes for fund comparison tools that improve financial literacy;
meeting the needs of those with disabilities; meeting the needs of those
that speak English as a second language; considering the individual
preferences of investors; and more opportunity for communication
between parties.89 The pilot programs should test a summarized interactive
slideshow that simplifies financial disclosure already available on EDGAR
and makes it accessible on smartphones, tablets, and laptops.90 Unlike the
SEC’s Disclosure Update and Simplification Rules in 2018, the resulting
regulations from these pilot programs would adequately address the
concerns regarding information overload and attention capacity.91
Developing a group of pilot programs testing interactive graphs,
slideshows, a more user-friendly interface, and more hyperlink utilization,
is the second step in solving the inefficiencies in the current financial
disclosure regime.
V. MODERNIZATION: SOLUTIONS FOR RELATED LAWS
Several laws that are still strictly adhered to have a legislative purpose
that is no longer relevant given technological advancements. For example,
certain funds are required to have prospectuses be delivered to each
shareholder by mail.92 This rule is still in place even though the ICI
estimated that it costs $2 billion in printing and mail expenses over ten
years.93 The SEC implemented Rule 30e-3 to allow certain investment
funds to use email as the default option, but the rule needs to be expanded
Letter from Eric J. Johnson, President, Donnelley, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC
(Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-18/s71218-4593947176329.pdf.
90 Summary disclosures, such as a mutual fund summary prospectus, currently exist.
See Mutual Fund Prospectus, INVESTOR.GOV, (https://www.investor.gov/introductioninvesting/investing-basics/glossary/mutual-fund-prospectus (last visited Oct. 6, 2020).
However, these are still very extensive (about 30 pages in most cases) and only available
in the traditional platforms. A slideshow would better captivate investor attention and
help avoid information overload, especially if the slideshow used summary boxes in the
top corners as proved effective by the IFIC.
91 See Su, supra note 78; supra text accompanying note 40 (explaining that even after
2018, some prospectuses were less simple than in previous years).
92 See Su, supra note 78 (explaining that after implementation of Rule 30e-3 certain
investment funds are allowed to transmit prospectuses digitally by default, meaning that
some are still transmitted by mail).
93 Id.
89
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to all securities.94 There is an argument that this rule would harm elderly
and rural investors who may not use technology and rely on mailings to
gather information.95 However, while investors could elect to get
disclosure via mail by contacting the appropriate company,96 the default
rule should reflect the majority preference.97 A study in 2017 found that
95% of mutual fund owners have internet access, compared to 68% in
2000. 98 The default rule should be that sending either an email or push
notification satisfies the “delivery” rule.99 This would lead to fewer costs,
more accessibility, and a better platform for viewing the material.
Additionally, proxy voting100 disclosure mailings could be eliminated
entirely unless an investor were to opt-in to mailings.101 A voting process
that took place entirely online would be streamlined, save resources, and

Id. See generally 17 C.F.R. pt. 200 et seq.
Su, supra note 78.
96 Optional Internet Availability of Investment Company Shareholder Reports Rules, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/investment/secg-optional-internet-availability-investmentcompany-shareholder-reports-rules (last modified Aug. 3, 2018).
97 280.86 million people used the internet in 2019, and this figure is projected to
increase in coming years. J. Clement, United States: Number of Internet Users 2015-2025,
STATISTA (July 14, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/325645/usa-number-ofinternet-users/ (Total internet users are “projected to grow to 296.7 million internet users
in 2025. The United States are one of the biggest online markets worldwide.”). This is
around eighty-six percent of the 2019 U.S. population as of January 1, 2019. U.S. World
and Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited Oct. 5, 2020). The number of people using the internet is likely even higher among
those that own securities. Sarah Holden et al., Ownership of Mutual Funds, Shareholder
Sentiment, and Use of the Internet, 23 ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 18 (2017),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per23-07.pdf.
98 Sarah Holden et. al., supra note 97, at 18.
99 Push Notification, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us
/dictionary/english/push-notification (last visited Sep. 27, 2020) (“[A] push notification
[is] . . . a message sent to a smartphone relating to one of its apps, even when it is not
running . . .”).
100 A proxy vote is a ballot cast by a shareholder regarding a proposed company
action. Shareholders receive a proxy ballot with a book of information in the mail
regarding the upcoming vote.
101 Will
Kenton, Proxy Vote, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/proxy-vote.asp (explaining that a proxy vote is
a ballot cast by a shareholder regarding a proposed company action and that shareholders
receive a proxy ballot with a book of information in the mail regarding the upcoming
votes).
94
95
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be good for the environment.102 It would not discourage the participation
of elderly and rural investors because the option to attend the stockholder
annual meeting or opt-in to mailings would still be available.103
Due to the widespread adoption of the internet, smartphones, and
computers, an “access equals delivery” rule is satisfactory to achieve the
original legislative purpose behind the delivery rule, which is to ensure that
all investors have access to reliable information.104 Ultimately, this type of
rule would be good for the environment, save the industry money, reduce
investor fees, and not unfairly burden elderly individuals or those living in
rural areas.105 Implementing the “access equals delivery” rule for all
securities is a necessary step in modernizing federal securities laws.

See Letter from Paul F. Roye, Senior Vice President, Capital Group, to Brent J.
Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-12-18/s712184587765-176294.pdf (“Production of paper prospectuses [including proxy voting] and
shareholder reports has a significant negative impact on the environment. For the
American Funds, over the 12-month period from July 2016 to June 2017, we mailed . . .
[a]pproximately 5,122 tons of paper . . . [t]his resulted in the destruction of about 122,000
trees. In addition, transporting this amount of paper required approximately 395 tractor
trailer truckloads, resulting in an increase in carbon emissions.”).
103 See id.; supra notes 95 and accompanying text.
104 This rule refers to the idea that being able to access the document satisfies the
delivery requirements laid out in the federal securities laws’ statutes and regulations. See
Securities Offering Reform, Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52056, IC-26993, 2005 WL
1692642 (Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243,
249, 274), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf (stating that [u]nder
such an “access equals delivery” model, investors are presumed to have access to the
Internet, and issuers and intermediaries can satisfy their delivery requirements if the
filings or documents are posted on a web site”). Several funds qualify for this type of rule
already, but certain funds have not been permitted to switch to this method. See Letter
from Jones Day to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-734.pdf (“In 2005, the Commission
adopted an “access equals delivery” model regarding the delivery of final prospectuses,
as set out in Securities Act Rules 172 and 173.”).
105 See Roye, supra note 102; supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. A company
having fewer compliance costs results in fewer costs being passed on to the investor
through fees. Alternatively, lower compliance costs would allow the money to be spent
elsewhere which would likely increase the value of a company. See Jones Day, supra note
104 (discussing the compliance costs for disclosures).
102
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION BARRIERS
The SEC would almost certainly be uncomfortable in considering
eliminating current disclosure requirements without having testing periods
for the new regulations. Major rule changes are unlikely to be considered
without a lengthy testing process—this is another cause of the inefficiency
in the financial disclosure regime. Thus, a workable solution must
necessarily start with increased financial burdens on the industry, but will
eventually benefit all industry players.
Problems with adding a new disclosure regulation without eliminating
others include increased compliance costs, legal uncertainty, use of SEC
resources, and a steep learning curve for all industry players. Extensive
research, including a cost-benefit analysis, must be conducted by the SEC
to determine if the adoption of these proposed financial disclosure
changes would be beneficial long-term. Certain statutes and regulations
also require such studies before implementing new regulations.106
Although this seems burdensome and unproductive, it could lead to major
benefits in the long run. For example, eventually the 10-Q could be
eliminated—decreasing compliance costs, reducing information overload,
and allowing companies to focus on long-term growth.107 Opponents of
See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a-1 (West 2020).
See e.g., Peter J. Henning, Companies are Pushing for Less Disclosure. Is that Good for
Investors?, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/busine
ss/dealbook/sec-disclosure-investors.html (“President Trump tweeted on Aug. 17 that
‘some of the world’s top business leaders’ want to stop reporting financial information
quarterly. He said he would ask the Securities and Exchange Commission to look at
requiring disclosure only every six months.”); Shivaram Rajgopal, What Would Happen if
the U.S. Stopped Requiring Quarterly Earnings Reports?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 6, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/09/what-would-happen-if-the-u-s-stopped-requiring-quarterlyearnings-reports (“In 2007, when the UK mandated the start of quarterly reporting, they
left the actual format of such disclosures up to individual firms. After the start of
mandatory quarterly reporting in the UK, the number of firms that issued quantitative
quarterly reports, defined as those with sales and earnings numbers, declined, suggesting
a decline in disclosure transparency. However, the number of firms that issued annual
earnings or sales guidance increased significantly.”); SU, supra note 76 (“Policy debates
have also focused on how frequently public companies are required to file reports with
the SEC. The frequency of reporting could affect investors’ access to information as well
as companies’ ongoing compliance costs. In the 115th Congress, bills were introduced
that would have directed the SEC to study the costs and benefits of 10-Q quarterly
reporting, especially to smaller issuers (S. 488 and H.R. 5970). Proponents of reducing
the frequency of quarterly reporting argue that in addition to the costs involved, it
106
107

130

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22

this change explain that frequent reporting increases analyst accuracy,
which is critical given the industry is becoming increasingly
institutionalized.108 Currently, institutional investors own 70% of stock
trading volume.109 However, if 10-Q’s were eliminated, all analysts, and
thus all investors, would be on the same playing field; no individual or
institution would be unduly burdened.110 Although the proposed solutions
would include additional short-term burdens for the industry, investors

distracts from companies’ longer-term strategies. Opponents of reduction are concerned
about potential negative effects on financial transparency and investor protection.”);
David Zaring, Should Companies Abandon Quarterly Earning Reports?, WHARTON (Aug. 27,
2018), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/ending-quarterly-reporting/
(“PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi suggested [abandoning 10-Q’s]. Nooyi, who is set to leave
PepsiCo in October, told Reuters that her comments were made in a broader context—
reorienting U.S. companies to have a longer-term view of their businesses and ‘to explore
the harmonization of the European system and the U.S. system of financial reporting.’ .
. . Advocates of the switch point to the savings for companies in accounting, legal and
other costs, and the latitude to focus on longer-term growth rather than to be dictated to
by quarterly earnings expectations . . . . David Zaring, Wharton professor of legal studies
and business ethics, agreed [and] said the SEC should seriously consider Trump’s
proposal given the substantial push for a change in reporting frequency.”).
108 Amelia Josephson, What Is an Institutional Investor?, SMART ASSET (July 24, 2019),
https://smartasset.com/investing/what-is-an-institutional-investor (“Most
of
the
trading that happens on the market is done by institutional investors. . . . The percentage
of corporate shares held by institutional investors has increased dramatically in the last
60 years. Today, the volume of trades by retail investors pales in comparison to the
trading activity of institutional investors.”); Rajgopal, supra note 107 (“Frequent reporting
increases analysts’ accuracy. Analyst coverage for UK firms increased after the
introduction of more frequent mandatory reporting, meaning more firms had at least one
dedicated analyst following its reporting. Analyst forecast error, defined as the difference
between actually reported earnings per share and forecasted earnings per share, fell for
firms after the introduction of mandatory reporting. These findings suggest that frequent
reporting makes it easier for sell-side analysts to cover firms.”).
109 Josephson, supra note 108 (“By some estimates, institutional investors account
for 70% of stock trading volume.”).
110 This is because 10-Q’s would be eliminated for everyone and all individuals and
institutions would still have the same amount of information for their analysis. There
would not be an asymmetric information issue. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 107 (discussing
how sophisticated investors use their vast resources to analyze quarterly reports before
the average investor even has the chance to review them.).
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will quickly realize the benefits.111 Substantial long-term benefits are likely
to follow for all market players.
VII. GLOBALIZATIONS CONSIDERATIONS
The U.S. capital markets are more regulated than any other market in
the world.112 As such, extensive simplification and modernization may
allow the U.S. to continue to compete internationally. For the past few
decades, seven markets have controlled most of the world’s market
capitalization—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Japan, and Germany—with the U.S. being the largest market.113 As
frequently echoed by economists, overregulation can negatively affect an
economy; this is a vital policy discussion in today’s political atmosphere.114
The U.S. prioritizes investor protection and has significantly less financial
market fraud than other countries.115 Therefore, the U.S. is almost certainly
111 See, e.g., id. (discussing how businesses could shift to a long-term growth mindset
if quarterly reports were no longer required, which could lead to long-term benefits).
112 See generally IPO Insights: Comparing Global Stock Exchanges 65, ERNST & YOUNG
(2009), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/IPO_Insights:_Comparing_glo
bal_stock_exchanges/$FILE/IPO_comparingglobalstockexchanges.pdf (a guide to the
United States’ highly regulated IPO process showcases their position as the most
regulated capital market in the world).
113 See, e.g., INT’L FIN. CORP., Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1999). Consider that,
since 1995, these those seven markets have accounted for 75%—and that percentage
increasing—of the world’s market capitalization.
114 See Peter J. Ferrara, How Overregulation Is Killing The Economy, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.investors.com/politics/commentary/howoverregulation-is-killing-the-economy/; Doug Schoen, Yes, There Is Such A Thing As OverRegulation, Forbes (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dougschoen/2015/12
/02/yes-there-is-such-a-thing-as-over-regulation/#6ae574754671 (regarding the annual
defense policy bill: “President [Obama] also proposed 2,224 new regulations just before
Thanksgiving. These rules have tremendous economic impact as 144 of them are set to
cost the American economy up to $100 million. To be sure, some of these rules are for
the greater good—for instance, contractors will be entitled to paid sick leave – but we
also know that there’s a lot in there that’s just regulation for the sake of regulation. And
that’s never a good thing . . . It follows that we must always be mindful of the impact that
over regulation plays in our economy . . . right now as more and more businesses suffer
at the hands of regulations and are forced out of business or overseas.”).
115 See,
e.g., Corruption Perception Index, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020). Although stock
market fraud is only one factor in corruption rankings, these figures provide an insight
into which countries have the resources to prevent fraud and have taken action to do so.
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going to continue to rank as one of the countries that require the most
financial disclosure and, therefore, have the highest compliance costs.116
Currently, the U.S. and Canada continue to require stricter disclosures,
while Japan and Germany require less restrictive disclosures, and the
United Kingdom lands somewhere in the middle.117
The U.S. dominates the international capital markets with a market
equity cap at about $32 trillion.118 Foreign stocks, such as the popular
Chinese company Alibaba, are often repackaged and sold in U.S.
markets.119 However, like any other U.S. fund, these types of investments
must be accompanied by significant financial disclosures explaining,
among other things, the risks of investing in foreign markets.120 Not only
could the proposed solutions in this paper modernize and simplify
financial disclosure and increase the efficiency of the SEC disclosure
regime, but they could also benefit the U.S. on a global level. The U.S.
could be the first major capital market to take important steps in

This statement is widely held to be true, and it is part of the reason the U.S. markets are
the most reliable and active markets in the world.
116 See generally Cost of Compliance Expected to Hit $181bn, BANKING EXCH. (April 13,
2020), https://www.bankingexchange.com/bsa-aml/item/8202-cost-of-complianceexpected-to-hit-181bn.
117 See Merritt. B. Fox, Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a
Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 MICH. L REV. 696, 758 (Dec 1998).
118 U.S. Capital Markets Deck 2018, SIFMA (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/
resources/research/us-capital-markets-deck-2018/ (“America has the largest and
deepest capital markets in the world—according to the Federal Reserve, the capital
markets provide approximately 80% of debt financing for businesses in the U.S. The
securities industry facilitates access to those markets, creating investor opportunity,
capital formation, job creation and economic growth.”).
119 Justin Kuepper, Top 10 Most Popular Foreign Stocks, THE BALANCE (Nov. 17, 2019)
(“International investors have access to virtually limitless opportunities around the world,
from Austria to Zambia. Buying and selling these foreign securities is easy to do through
the use of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and American Depository Receipts (ADRs).
These investment products) cover the vast majority of popular companies and countries
around the world … [ADRs are] a popular way for American investors to invest in foreign
companies. ADRs are created when U.S. banks purchase a bulk lot of shares from a
company, bundle them into groups, and reissue them on a U.S. stock exchange. The bank
then manages the ratio of U.S. ADRs to foreign shares to ensure that the ADRs are
accurately priced on U.S. exchanges.”).
120 See, e.g., Summary Prospectus, FIDELITY INT’L INDEX FUND (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/summary/315911727.
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transforming its disclosure regime to acknowledge modern technology
and widely held views in academia.
Some jurisdictions have leveraged modern technology to make
financial disclosure more efficient, less environmentally harmful, and
more responsive to majority preferences.121 The European Union and
Australia allow for funds to simply notify investors that financial disclosure
is available on their website, and send a mailed copy upon the request of
an investor.122 In Canada, an electronic copy of the report can be provided,
with a paper copy upon request.123 However, these minor discrepancies
alone have not proven significant enough to have an impact on U.S.
competition globally.124
Diversity among disclosure standards between capital markets can be
positive—it can drive competition and lead to the most efficient outcome;
on the contrary, it could also drive the smaller market to match the
regulatory regime of the larger market to remain competitive.125 Although
treaties exist so that corporations can offer securities in multiple
jurisdictions, globalization concerns abound as foreign markets continue
to grow.126 The U.S has pushed for foreign jurisdictions to adopt
conforming securities legal regimes, but with limited success.127
Nonetheless, Japan and Switzerland have adopted certain insider trading
laws to reconcile with U.S. policy, but a uniform financial disclosure regime
This has primarily been done in foreign jurisdictions through the adoption of the
“access equals delivery rule” for all securities. See Roye, supra note 102.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See SIFMA, supra note 118.
125 See Cally Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United States
in the Driver's Seat, 4 CA. PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 577, 592 (1995) (discussing how the
adoption of the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System between the United States and
Canada has resulted in a shift in Canada's securities regime toward that of the United
States).
126 See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money:
Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORD. L. REV. 5 at 1890, n. 73 (1997),
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3361&context=flr (“Canada
and the United States also entered into a bilateral agreement in 1991, the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, with respect to offering information disclosure
requirements. Under the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, Canadian issuers may
issue securities in the United States while complying with Canadian registration and
disclosure requirements so long as the issuer's financial statements conform to the United
States’ generally accepted accounting principles.”).
127 Id.
121
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has yet to be universally implemented.128 It is possible that if the U.S.
displays to other markets that this paper’s proposed regulatory changes
result in an efficient U.S. disclosure regime, other jurisdictions could
conform to U.S. financial disclosure standards. This has the potential to
benefit investors worldwide; furthermore, continued competition to find
the efficient outcome in a disclosure regime would no longer be necessary
as these changes, and future adaptations, can maximize efficiency.
The U.S. remains the leader in overall capital market size, so significant
improvements to address the inefficiencies in financial disclosure
regulations are likely to result from U.S. leadership.129 However, this is not
to say that foreign jurisdictions do not pose a threat to the U.S. market.
Recent revelations display that a decline in U.S. IPOs and improvements
in foreign markets’ stability present a challenge to the U.S in retaining its
market share.130 Thus, taking steps to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of financial disclosure can stimulate the U.S. economy while
providing incentives for major corporations to remain incorporated in the
United States.

128 Id. Additionally, certain markets, such as Japan, have modeled their securities legal
regime around the United States’ laws. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities
Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies,16
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV 149, 151 (1993).
129 See U.S. Capital Markets Deck 2018, SIFMA (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.sifma.o
rg/resources/research/us-capital-markets-deck-2018/.
130 Richard R. Ellsworth, Capital Markets and Competitive Decline, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept. 1985), https://hbr.org/1985/09/capital-markets-and-competitive-decline (“The
growing strength of the United States’ foreign competitors and our economic malaise are
common topics for discussion in our country today. Yet the causes most frequently
enumerated—the lack of an effective national industrial policy, shortsighted management
practices, and the strong dollar—do not adequately explain the basic predicament,
although they address important issues. Rather, the competitive decline afflicting many
Fortune ‘500’ companies in large part reflects management’s preoccupation with capitalmarket conventions that divert attention from product-market needs and frustrate efforts
to improve competitiveness.”). Recent improvements and opportunities for growth have
been observed in both the German and Japanese capital markets. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The inefficiencies of government may be inescapable. The private
sector generally has fewer levels of review and is better situated to quickly
adapt to technological improvements. However, academic research and
modern technology have created tools to address the inefficiencies in
government, specifically within the executive branch and financial
disclosure regulations. Finding the correct balance between preventing
fraud by forcing the production of critical information and avoiding
informational overload from overregulation is an ongoing challenge.
Modernization and simplification offer techniques to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of financial disclosure, and the SEC has
demonstrated that these concerns have been on its radar. However, the
SEC’s current actions do not go far enough given the widely held views in
academia regarding information overload and attention capacity.
Academic research strongly suggests that a simplified form of
financial disclosure should be introduced—thus, the answer to Question
One, should a simplified form of financial disclosure be introduced, is yes.
Therefore, the SEC should require a one-page summary report containing
only key information. The government must modernize financial
disclosure to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the SEC financial
disclosure regime. This can be done by first permitting the launching of
pilot programs that make disclosure available on user-friendly platforms
that incorporate interactive graphs, slideshows, and hyperlinks, and second
implementing an “access equals delivery” rule for all securities. These
actions provide the answer to Question Two regarding how financial
disclosure, and the related body of regulations, can be modernized via
current technology. Once these initial actions are completed, the resulting
successes can allow for more drastic steps to be taken in the attempt to
maximize the efficiency in the SEC’s financial disclosure regime. The
foundations behind this paper’s proposed solutions provide an outline of
approaches to improve efficiency within other executive branch agencies
and regulations as well.
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